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FEDERAL STATUTORY REVIEW UNDER SECTION 1983
AND THE APA
Henry Paul Monaghan*
INTRODUCTION

Following hard on the heels of two unanimous decisions sustaining
the authority of state courts to enforce federal law,I two more unanimous rulings at the end of the 1989 Supreme Court Term strongly emphasized their duty to do so. McKesson Corporationv. Division ofAlcoholic

Beverages & Tobacco,2 held that the states must provide meaningful
postpayment remedies for parties forced to pay state taxes that had
4
3
been extracted contrary to the commerce clause, and Howlett v. Rose

affirmed the existence of a nearly inescapable duty in the state courts to

entertain section 1983 actions. 5 Additionally, three days after Howlett,
the Court held in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,6 that the Boren

Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which requires states to reimburse
health care providers in accordance with rates that are "'reasonable
and adequate to meet the cost... incurred,' " is enforceable by providers in section 1983 actions. 7 Finally, in Dennis v. Higgins,8 the Court
granted certiorari to decide whether dormant commerce clause claims
can be maintained under section 1983.

Against this background of unfolding opportunities for plaintiffs to
vindicate their federal rights, Golden State Transit Corporationv. City of Los
Angeles, 9 decided early in the Term, may escape much independent notice even among federal court specialists despite its'likely significance.
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University School
of Law.
1. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990) (Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990) (civil RICO action).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
3. See also James B. Beame Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 259 Ga. 363, 382 S.E.2d 95
(1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2616 (1990), in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably to clarify the nature of the duty. In theory, perhaps, the duty imposed
by McKesson might be discharged by a state administrative agency. But the practical bite
of the Court's ruling is, as it was in McKesson itself, on the state judicial system.
4. 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
6. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
7. Id. at 2516, 2518-19.
8. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676 (1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
9. 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989). The Court's only other § 1983 decision during the Term
came in Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990). There, the Court held that
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This is, in part, because of its rather drab character. Three years earlier, the Court had construed the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") to preempt a municipality's effort to condition renewal of a
taxi cab franchise on the franchisee's settlement of a pending labor dispute.' 0 On remand, the lower federal courts obediently required
franchise reinstatement, but they refused to award compensatory damages, holding that section 1983 was inapplicable to this preemption
claim." The Supreme Court reversed the section 1983 holding. 12
While disclaiming as "obviously ... incorrect" any assertion that all
federal preemption claims could be asserted under section 1983, a 6-3
majority found that the "federal right" created by the NLRA itself
3
could be so enforced.'
Three decades before Golden State, Monroe v. Pape 14 had established
section 1983 as a vehicle for affirmative enforcement of federal constitutional rights. Nearly twenty years later, Maine v. Thiboutot '5 did the
same for federal statutory rights, when the Court held that section 1983
is not restricted to enforcing federal statutes providing for equal rights.
Golden State magnifies Thiboutot's importance; despite its 'disclaimer,
Golden State confirms a general framework for section 1983 that authorizes its sweeping use not only in the preemption context but also in
any case in which the plaintiff can establish the existence of a "federal
right."' 6 This is a matter of considerable importance given the Court's
increasing resistance to implying rights of action from federal
17
statutes.
Golden State's important implications for the scope of section 1983
alone warrant a careful analysis, and this is the focus of Part I. Part II
uses the division within the Golden State Court as a background against
which to examine the uncertainty and confusion in the taxonomy and
categories of analysis that sometimes surround judicial enforcement of
duties imposed by federal substantive law. It discusses the need to esneither the Territory of Guam nor a territorial official is a "person" within the meaning
of § 1983.
10. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 615-19
(1986) (relying largely upon 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)).
11. See 660 F. Supp. 571, 576-78 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 110 S.Ct. 444 (1989).
12. See 110 S. Ct. at 452.
-

13. Id. at 449-52.

14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
15. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
16. Wilder extended the logic of Golden State beyond the preemption context. In
Wilder, the entire Court functioned within the Golden State framework. The Wilder dissent
was confined almost entirely to the narrow issue of whether the Boren Amendment conferred any substantive rights on health care providers. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2527 (1990) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The dissent suggests
by implication, however, that the dissenting justices may not be willing to apply Golden
State expansively.
17. See infra notes 91, 96 and accompanying text.
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tablish both a primary and remedial right in order to secure relief. Finally, in Part III Golden State is compared with judicial review under
section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").' 8 Section
1983 is customarily thought of as a "constitutional tort" statute. 19 But
that vision is incomplete. Often section 1983 operates simply as a way
of determining whether state officials have complied with federal statutory norms-and here the analogue is section 702, in which the issue is
whether federal (rather than state) officials have transgressed federal
statutory norms. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,20 decided on the
final day of the 1989 Term, shows that, despite considerable differences
in the operative legal vocabulary, a framework parallel to that established by Golden State for review of action by state officials under section
1983 has emerged for APA review under section 702. In each context
the Court must determine whether public officials have violated federal
statutory duties of which the plaintiffs are "intended" rather than "incidental" beneficiaries.
I.

THE GOLDEN STATE DECISION

Although the Court in Golden State decided that a federal preemption claim was enforceable under section 1983, the dissent was troubled that a federal immunity could constitute a "right" within the
meaning of section 1983. But the weaknesses inherent in the dissent's
analysis raise important issues that are fundamental to any inquiry into
the availability of rights of action under section 1983. Golden State is
usefully approached, therefore, by first examining the dissenting opinion of Justice Kennedy and then turning to the opinion for the Court
authored by Justice Stevens.
A. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion

For Justice Kennedy, a claim of immunity from state action based
solely upon a federal statute's preemptive effect does not create a
"right" within the meaning of section 1983 because section 1983 does
not include immunities resulting "solely" from the division of power in
the federal system. His analysis is problematic, however, because he
assumes that the district court in Golden State had the authority to grant
injunctive relief, but not damages. Yet unless a right of action arose
under section 1983 or was implied from the NLRA, it is not clear that
the district court had "arising under" jurisdiction, 2 1 and thus any au18. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
19. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (best known example of this

notion); accord Symposium: Section 1983: The Constitution and the Courts, 77 Geo.
LJ. 1441 (1989), particularly the articles by Professors Abernathy and Nahmod. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) is

Monroe's natural tort analogue at the federal level.
20. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).

21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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thority to enjoin the federally preempted conduct.
Drawing upon the celebrated analytical framework constructed by
Professor Hohfeld in his series of articles beginning with Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied inJudicialReasoning,22 Justice Kennedy
characterized the preemption claim as a simple claim of a federal
"immunity":
The city's lack of power gives rise to a correlative legal interest
in [plaintiff] that we did not discuss in [our previous decision].
The majority has chosen to call the interest a right. I would
prefer to follow the familiar Hohfeldian terminology and say
that Golden State has an immunity from the city's interference
with the NLRA. This terminology best reflects Congress' intent to create [a] free zone of bargaining .... 23
Justice Kennedy recognized that, in terms, section 1983 embraces
" 'the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws.' "24 But, for him, the "immunity" conferred
by the NLRA was not one "secured" within the meaning of section
1983 because this statute does not protect "those interests merely resulting from the allocation of power between the State and Federal
25
Governments."
Justice Kennedy's appeal to the Hohfeldian distinction between
rights and immunities cannot carry him very far. The Hohfeldian categories (as we shall see) lack resolving power; 26 they are entirely formal
and descriptive. 2 7 Accordingly, they cannot inform the crucial substantive decision whether a federal immunity claim can be asserted affirmatively. Because that determination turns solely on the wishes of
Congress, 28 justice Kennedy was quickly forced to undertake a detailed
examination of section 1983's legislative history and the Court's cases
construing the statute. 29 The necessity for examination of the meaning
of the relevant statute, not Hohfeld, is clarified by analogy to other fed22. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16 (1913); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1917). Professor Hohfeld published these articles
together in 1919 in a work entitled Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied injudicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays. See also Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale L.J. 163 (1919) (setting forth definitional system based on Hohfeld).
23. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S.Ct. 444, 453 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 453 -54.
26. See infra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
27. Moreover, Hohfeld's analysis centered on the common law, and it is not evident
how much this analytical system illuminates public law fields such as constitutional and
administrative law. There is a considerable literature denying that public law is adequately understood through the framework of the common law categories. See P. Bator,
P. Mishkin, D. Meltzer & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 79-82 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter, Hart and Wechsler].
28. See infra notes 51-53, 75 and accompanying text.
29. See 10 S.Ct. at 454-55.
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eral statutes that are concerned with federal immunities. For example,
the statute that governs the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state
courts authorizes review when "any title, right, privilege or immunity is
specially set up or claimed" under federal law.3 0 Surely, Justice Kennedy would not believe that a Hohfeldian "immunity" claim would not
qualify for the purposes of section 1257.
Justice Kennedy's rejection of the section 1983 claim left him with
deep difficulties. What was the source of the district court's authority
to enjoin the federally preempted conduct? Did the district court have
"arising under" subject matter jurisdiction; and even if so, did the
court have the authority to award an injunction? Justice Kennedy
moved so quickly that he did not separate these issues.
Early in his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that an "injured party
does not need § 1983 to vest in him a right to assert [in the federal
district court] that an attempted [state] exercise of jurisdiction or control violates the proper distribution of powers within the federal system." 3 1 He cited without elaboration such great decisions as Gibbons v.
Ogden,32 Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. ,3 and Cooley v. Board of
Wardens.34 But none of these decisions involved the nature of the district court's "arising under" jurisdiction; each was rendered on appellate review of a state court judgment rejecting a federal defense and
thus fell squarely within section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 3 5 the
predecessor of present 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Only at the close of his opinion did Justice Kennedy seek to ground his claim that the district court
could award equitable or declaratory relief:
Our omission of any discussion of § 1983 [when Golden State
was first before the court] perhaps stemmed from a recognition that plaintiffs may vindicate Machinists pre-emption claims
by seeking declaratory and equitable relief in the federal district courts through their powers under federal jurisdictional
statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 ed.); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201
(Supp. 1989); 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1982 ed.); New York Tel. Co. v.
New York Labor Dept., 440 U.S. 519, 525, 99 S.Ct. 1328, 1332,
59 L.Ed. 2d 553 (1979) (plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief on a Machinists pre-emption claim). These statutes do not limit jurisdiction to those who can show the
deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law within the meaning of § 1983.36
This analysis fails. To begin with, it does not explain why the dis30.
31.
"arising
32.
33.
34.

28 U.S.G. § 1257 (1988).
110 S. Ct. at 453. If § 1983 is available, the district courts automatically have
under" jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).

35. 1 Stat. 73.
36. 110 S. Ct. at 455.
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trict court could have awarded declaratory and injunctive relief but not
damages under the cited statutes. But the difficulties run deeper. Section 1331 is simply the general "arising under" jurisdictional statute;
the statute merely confers jurisdiction when a plaintiff has a right of
action-it does not itself create a right of action.3 7 Justice Kennedy's
references to the Declaratory Judgment Act,38 are even more inapposite. That act is remedial only; it is not designed to confer any "jurisdiction," let alone to dispense with the need to establish a right of
action. 39 Finally, New York Telephone, the only decision cited by Justice
Kennedy, simply observes that (like Golden State) the case arose as a suit
to enjoin conduct preempted by the NLRA, 40without commenting on
the source of the federal court's jurisdiction.
Perhaps because he thought the district court's jurisdiction to
award equitable and declaratory relief to any preemption plaintiff so
clear, Justice Kennedy made no mention of several recent decisions
41
that seemingly did so hold. For example, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
the Court said that a "plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state
regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal
courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve."' 42 But if
Shaw and similar decisions are read to establish the district courts' authority to award relief to nondamages-seeking, federal preemption
plaintiffs, they provide no explanation for their result.
The difficulty with both Shaw and Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Golden State, is the source of subject matter jurisdiction. Shaw did posit
a distinction between plaintiffs claiming preemption, for whom jurisdic37. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) ("[a]s stated above,
the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and grant of a right of action must be made with
specificity"); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
249 (1951) ("TheJudicial Code, in vesting jurisdiction in the District Courts, does not
create causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising from
other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions.").
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988).

39. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). This statement may need
some qualification at the edges, see Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 n.19 (1987); Note, Developments in the Law:
Declaratory Judgment-1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 802-03 (1949); infra notes

51-55 and accompanying text.
40. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 525
(1979).

41. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
42. Id. at 96 n.14; cf. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (up-

holding jurisdiction in declaratory judgment action based on preemption claim);
Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 259 n.6

(1985) (noting that federal court could exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment
action based on preemption claim). If this dubious authority is sound, then an injunction is also proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1988).
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tion was available, and plaintiffs seeking a declaration of nonpreemption. 4 3 Congress could, of course, draw precisely such a jurisdictional
line, and such a line possesses intuitive appeal. But whether that line
reflects existing "arising under"44 doctrine is another matter. Under the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule, the existence of a federal immunity to
a state law claim does not confer "arising under" jurisdiction.45 The
result should not be different simply because the immunity holder is
the plaintiff. Under PublicService Commission v. WycoffCo. ,46 federal court
jurisdiction is not available if the plaintiff simply alleges a claim of a
right to be let alone because federal statutory or constitutional law so
requires. 4 7 There, the Court said:
If the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim under federal law,
it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an action for a
declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim.
This is dubious even though the declaratory complaint sets
forth a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the
nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action. Federal
courts will not seize litigations from state courts merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal court to bebefore the state court begins the
gin his federal-law defense
48
case under state law.
The tension between Wycoffand Shaw is obvious, 49 and has already
been noted in the courts of appeals.5 0 Shaw seems wrong, if read to
permit any federal immunity holder automatic access to federal courts
43. See 463 U.S. at 96 n.14.
44. See the line of decisions elucidating the well-pleaded complaint rule: Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 154 (1908); 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3566 (1989); infra note 45. The doctrine is
not, however, of constitutional dimension. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494-97 (1983).
45. An illustrative case is Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1519
(1989), in which Native American tribes asserted a federal immunity to efforts by the
state to collect taxes. The Court conduded that any such "immunity may provide a
federal defense to Oklahoma's claims.... But it has long been settled that the existence
of a federal immunity to the claims asserted does not convert a suit otherwise arising
under state law into one which, in the statutory sense, arises under federal law." Id. at
1521.
46. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
47. See id. at 248-49.
48. Id. at 248.
49. Justice Brennan's opinion in Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16 n.14, 19 n.19 (1983), attempts to read Wycoff more narrowly
than the language quoted in the textjustifies. Yet he also appears to endorse the Shaw
doctrine. See id. at 20 n.20 ("a person subject to a scheme of federal regulation may sue
in federal court to enjoin application to him of conflicting state regulations").
50. In Playboy Enters. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 29-30 (Ist Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 388 (1990), and First Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 776 n.3
(8th Cir. 1990), both of the courts noted the apparent conflict between Wycoff and Shaw
and followed Shaw. The court's approach in Playboy Enterprises is particularly puzzling
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for declaratory and injunctive relief. Unless Congress otherwise directs, as it has in various removal statutes, 5' generally the plaintiff must
52
assert a right to sue in order to establish "arising under" jurisdiction.
That is, a plaintiff asserting a substantive federal immunity-or even a
53
federal primary right-must also assert a remedial right of action.
This rule has been relaxed to the extent that the Court seems willing to
permit declaratory judgment suits without insisting upon a right of action when the defendant could have maintained a coercive suit under
federal law. 54 , But, of course, even if the DeclaratoryJudgment Act permits party realignment and alteration in the timing of an otherwise
proper federal court suit, that exception is not broad enough to explain
jurisdiction in cases such as Shaw in which plaintiffs seek access to federal courts based solely on their own federal immunities. 55
The plaintiff in Golden State surely satisfied the standard established
under Bell v. Hood 56 and its progeny that a colorable claim of a federal
right of action suffices to establish "arising under" jurisdiction. 57 But
even if subject matter jurisdiction would exist for the plaintiff to seek an
because it went on to find that § 1983 was applicable. See 906 F.2d at 31. If so, there is
no doubt that arising under jurisdiction exists.
51. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988) (removal by federal officers); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262-71 (1880) (sustaining constitutionality of removal statute
and allowing removal by federal official asserting federal defense).
52. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 249 (1951); Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 42 ("No
one can sue.., unless authorized by law to do so .... ); Hart & Wechsler, supra note
27, at 995. But see Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 20 n.20, 26-27 & nn. 30-31; Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1038-40, 1053-56.
53. The right of action can come from the Constitution, of course. See Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 68-70 & n.13 (1978). In principle, the right of action could also come from state law. See Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 995 (Proposition B). In Golden State, perhaps a right of action drawn from state law would have sufficed for purposes of arising underjurisdiction (although the taxi company did not make
that argument). This seems doubtful, however, after Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813-17 (1986), which indicates judicial hostility to recognizing arising under jurisdiction on a state right of action when Congress has refused to
provide a federal right of action.
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Indeed Wycoff itself can be read to
endorse jurisdiction in such a situation. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
55. The Shaw Court cited Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), for the proposition
that "federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from interfering
with federal rights." 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. But Ex Parte Young does not dispense with the
requirement that the plaintiff assert a federal remedial right, and the Court has long
been understood to have assumed such a right from the fourteenth amendment. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
400-02 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1181.
Perhaps the Court in Shaw implicitly assumed the existence of an implied right of action
under ERISA for preemption plaintiffs. Yet surely Justice Kennedy did not assume that
the Golden State plaintiffs had an implied right of action under the NLRA.
56. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
57. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1024-25 (collecting cases).
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injunction, Kennedy's assertion that a remedy other than relief under
section 1983 would be available seems unjustified. To obtain injunctive
relief, the plaintiff must do more than establish a colorable claim: a
right of action must actually be established before injunctive relief is
appropriate. 58 For example, California v. Sierra Club 5 9 was a suit by an
environmental organization and several of its members to enjoin construction of a state water project as a violation of a federal statutory
prohibition on unauthorized waterway obstructions. Presumably, the
complaint satisfied the requirements of Bell v. Hood. After extended
analysis, though, the Court concluded that the relevant federal statute
did not confer a private right of action on the plaintiffs. 60 The Court
then declined an invitation to address the merits of the controversy
notwithstanding this defect: "we cannot consider the merits of a claim
which Congress has not authorized [plaintiffs] to raise." 61 Unless Justice Kennedy assumed that the Golden State plaintiffs possessed an implied right of action under the NLRA, his denial of a right of action
under section 1983 would have left the plaintiffs without a remedy in
the federal courts, despite his assertions to the contrary.
B. Justice Stevens's Opinion: The Searchfor a Federal "Right"
The Court's opinion in Golden State, written by Justice Stevens, deserves careful attention from three perspectives: first, its emphasis on
the importance of an underlying federal right; second, its rejection of
any attempt to formulate a general exclusion from section 1983 of interests that are the "sole result" of preemption; and finally, the extended reach of section 1983 confirmed, if not established, by the
decision.
Analytically, the Court's opinion contains much that is satisfying.
The entire opinion is cast in terms of a judicial hunt for a "federal
right," which is consistent with section 1983's focus on the "deprivation of any rights" secured by federal law, and the statute's provision of
58. Declaratory judgments and injunctions are simply remedies. The Declaratory
Judgment Act has obscured this fact because one of its principal uses is to obtain negative declarations-in that respect it enlarges upon the office of the injunction. See, e.g.,
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 573 n.41 (1947) (declaratory judgments not subject to remedial limitations governing injunctions, such as proof
of irreparable injury).

59. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
60. Id. at 292-98.
61. Id. at 298; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649 (1963) ("arising
under" jurisdiction but no federal right of action); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v.
Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249, 255 (1951) (same). Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 27, at 1025 n.3, is correct in insisting that "notwithstanding Bell, there is
often a complete functional congruence between the question whether the plaintiff
states a valid claim of federal right and the question whether, forjurisdictional purposes,
the case 'arises under' federal law."
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a "remedy [that] encompasses violations of ...[such] rights. '6 2 The
Court recognizes that while section 1983 "must be broadly construed,"
the preemption plaintiff nonetheless "must assert the violation of a federal right."' 63 Apparently, section 1983's additional references to "privileges or immunities" secured by federal law refer to claims that in
some important way also possess the structure of "rights." This concern with the contours of a federal right is quite understandable and
has its roots, in part, in article III's "case or controversy" requirement.
Courts do not confer discretionary benefits; a case requires that the
plaintiff assert a claim of right.64 This means, as the Court correctly
recognized, that a plaintiff seeking access to a federal court must assert
more than that the federal statute expresses a congressional "preference";65 the plaintiff must assert an interest sufficiently specific to be
66
capable of judicial enforcement.
If violation of a federal "right" can be established, section 1983 is
available, the Court said, unless Congress has " 'specifically foreclosed
a remedy [thereunder].' "67 The Court then undertook an inquiry for
the requisite right.68 In a single sentence the Court denied that the
supremacy clause itself could constitute a general source of rights enforceable through section 1983.69 That clause simply states a rule of

priority: valid federal law prevails over conflicting state law. By itself
the clause provides no algorithm for determining when concededly
62. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 448 (1989).
63. Id. The need for a "right" has been expressed in earlier section 1983 decisions. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 423-24 (1987). But in no prior decision does the concept dominate the opinion as
it does in Golden State.
64. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926) ("In passing upon the
application the court exercises judicial judgment. It does not confer or withhold a
favor.").
65. This point was first emphasized in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S.Ct.
2510, 2517 (1990) (statute "creates an enforceable right unless it reflects merely a 'congressional preference' ") (emphasis added).
66. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32; Former Special Project Employees Ass'n v. City
of Norfolk, 909 F.2d 89, 93-94 (4th Cir. 1990).
67. 110 S.Ct. at 448 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005, n.9 (1984)).
68. The Court's analysis here follows automatically from its preemption holding in
the earlier case, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
In that case, the Court had implicitly held that the taxi company had a remedial right
sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. That remedial right must have been based on
§ 1983, since it probably could not have been implied directly from the NLRA. See infra
note 91 and accompanying text. The only other possible source for jurisdiction presumed by the first Golden State decision is the Shaw case, which was probably incorrectly
decided as to the availability of subject matter jurisdiction without the existence of any
remedial right of action. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text. It seems
doubtful, however, that Shaw provided the basis for the plaintiff's right to sue because in
the initial Golden State decision the Court did not foreclose the award of damages on
remand. See 475 U.S. at 620.
69. See 110 S.Ct. at 449.
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valid federal law can be asserted only as a defense, or when it can be
employed also as a sword.
The heart of the Court's opinion is contained in the sentences that
immediately follow its rejection of the claim under the supremacy
clause. The Court first noted that
[gliven the variety of situations in which preemption claims
may be asserted, in state court and in federal court, it would
obviously be incorrect to assume that a federal right of action
pursuant to § 1983 exists every time a federal rule of law
preempts state regulatory authority. Conversely, the fact that
a federal statute has preempted certain state action does not
crepreclude the possibility that the same federal statute may
70
ate a federal right for which § 1983 provides a remedy.
This reasoning led to the following formulation:
In all cases, the availability of the § 1983 remedy turns on
whether the statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations "sufficiently specific and definite" to be .within "the
competence of the judiciary to enforce," Wright, 479 U.S., at
432 ....is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not [specifically] foreclosed ....71
Turning to the task of applying these principles, the Court found that
the "nub of the controversy" turned on whether the NLRA created
"rights" in labor and management that are "protected . . .against

governmental73 interference," 7 2 and it answered that question
affirmatively.
The Court is surely correct that federal statutory preemption of
state action "does not preclude the possibility that the same statute may
create a federal right for which § 1983 provides a remedy." But care
must be taken to see the precise work that the concept of "right" does
here. Congress could confine assertion of a federal immunity claim to a
defense in a state law enforcement proceeding; indeed, federal preemption claims often work precisely that way. But Osborn v. Bank of the
United States 74 long ago established that Congress also can invest the
70. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 449-52. While for our purposes we can assume that the Court has
correctly analyzed the NLRA, the opinion does seem to involve some shift in reasoning.
In the previous Golden State opinion, the Court held that § 8(d) of the NLRA, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), preempted the city policy. See Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 616-19 (1986). But on this occasion, the
Court seemed to locate the right enforceable by § 1983 not in § 8(d) but in the NLRA's
general structure. See 110 S. Ct. at 450-52.
74. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, the Court held that the United States
Bank can sue to enjoin state officials from collecting a state tax to which the Bank is
immune. While the Osborn Court paid insufficient attention to the issue, it seems to have
assumed that the existence of a specific jurisdictional statute supported the bank's right
to press affirmatively its federal preemption claim. See id. at 817-18.
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federal immunity shield with the character of a sword-unconstrained
by legal abstractions such as "rights" and "immunities." Congress
75
need only make clear its will.

As section 1983 itself shows, terms such as "rights" are the familiar
staples of the legal structure and are frequently employed by Congress.
Without contrary Congressional direction, courts should be expected
to interpret legislation within the familiar framework. But more specifically, when a section 1983 action is filed in a federal court, that court's
recognition of a federal "right" will be important in two ways: in Golden
State, for example, the existence of a federal "right" under the NLRA
meant jurisdictionally that "arising under" jurisdiction was incontestable; 76 substantively, it allowed for the award of damages and attorneys
77
fees.
C. Scope of the Golden State Decision
1. Of Personal Rights and Federalism. - In Golden State, the Court
stated that "it would obviously be incorrect" to conclude that section
1983 is available "every time a federal rule of law preempts state regulatory authority." This conclusion followed, the Court said, because of
"the variety of situations in which preemption claims may be asserted,
in state and in federal court .... "78 Seemingly, this perception would
instruct the Court that in each case judicial consideration must be focused upon context-specific factors such as the extent to which affirmative challenges would disrupt state programs and the need for
affirmative enforcement. Instead, however, the Court immediately
fashioned a general approach that is unconnected to any of the restrictive implications of its reasoning: unless specifically displaced, section
1983 is available to any plaintiff with a federal right to enforce federally
established legal duties. Put differently, despite its disclaimer, the
Court does not treat preemption claims differently from any other
claims raised by a section 1983 plaintiff.
At the center of the differences between the dissent and the Court
is Justice Kennedy's effort to distinguish the treatment of preemptive
claims from other section 1983 claims. For him, section 1983 requires
75. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 18
n.17 (1983); text accompanying supra notes 51-52; infra note 125 and accompanying

text.
76. See American Well Works Co. v. Layne &Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
("[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action"); Hart & Wechsler, supra
note 27, at 995 (Proposition A).

77. Note that if the Court's presumption in the earlier Golden State case that the
plaintiff properly asserted a remedial right of action was based on Shaw rather than
§ 1983, see supra note 68, then the Court's § 1983 holding in the second case is only
meaningful because it adds damages and the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
78. 110 S.Ct. at 449; see also text accompanying supra note 70 (where the passage
under discussion is quoted in full).
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that the plaintiff assert some identifiable "plus" apart from the simple
existence of the preemptive federal law-federal property entitlements
would qualify, such as the right to a particular rent calculation or to
social security benefits. 79 Justice Kennedy also believed that section
1983 embraced cases like Monroe v. Pape,8 0 because the official conduct
challenged in these cases "constitutes only an element in the primary
wrong that the injured party seeks to vindicate."8 1 But section 1983
would not include federal statutory interests that are "the sole result of
the [federal] statute's preemptive effect." 8 2 These interests reflect only
the appropriate distribution of power between the nation and the
states; they do not establish the kind of "personal interest" secured by
section 1983.
To my mind, Justice Kennedy's attempt to isolate interests that are
"the sole result" of preemption is unconvincing. He cited no convincing historical support for his analysis, 8 3 and without such a basis no
84
other principled difference between Monroe and Golden State appears.
In each case, the plaintiff seeks damages complaining that state officials
have interfered with a federally secured right to be let alone. Justice
Kennedy seems to have unconsciously assumed that the interests protected by the common law of torts (at issue in Monroe) implicate section
1983 but not those protected by the, common law of contracts (at issue
in Golden State). Why that should be so is never made clear in his opinion. More fundamentally, in seeking to identify interests that are "the
sole result" of federal preemption, Justice Kennedy fails to recognize
that every claim against state officials based upon federal regulatory or
entitlement law is, in the end, "the sole result" of federal preemption.
If the otherwise applicable state rule (a rule of no recovery) is dis85
placed, it is only because it has been displaced by valid federal law.
79. See 110 S. Ct. at 454.
80. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
81. 110 S. Ct. at 455.
82. Id. at 454. Of course, the Court partially agrees. It requires the existence of a
"right."
83. See id. The sparse historical analysis Justice Kennedy cited refers only to
§ 1983's reach with respect to constitutional claims. See id. (quoting Remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1871)). Moreover, he acknowledged that "[o]ur cases in recent years have expanded the scope of § 1983 beyond that
contemplated by the sponsor of the statute..." Id.
84. Justice Kennedy's endorsement of the use of § 1983 in the rent calculation and
social security benefit cases is discussed supra text accompanying note 79 and infra text
accompanying note 159.
85. Thus, in Howlett v. Rose, an opinion justice Kennedy joined, § 1983 was held to
preempt a state rule that accorded a sovereign immunity defense to a local school board.
See 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2442-45 (1990). The state rule will be displaced whether the immediate source of preemption is a federal statute, a federal administrative rule, or the
federal Constitution itself. I put to one side those areas, if any, in which state law ceased
to operate at all because of the Constitution. See generally Hill, The Law-Making Power
of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1030-68
(1967) (discussing areas in which the Constitution itself forecloses state action).
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Stripped of historical support, Justice Kennedy needs some theory
to support his distinctions. That theory will be hard to come by; indeed
no coherent theory seems plausible. Consider in this context the question to be argued in Dennis v. Higgins:86 whether section 1983 is available to vindicate a dormant commerce clause claim. Presumably, for
Justice Kennedy the "immunity" conferred by the clause is not "secured" by section 1983; the commerce clause is concerned with the appropriate distribution of power between the nation and the state and
thus does not involve the kinds of personal rights embraced by section
1983. But the "and thus" is a non sequitur; the purported dichotomy
between distribution of power and personal rights issues is illusory.8 7
For the Framers and well into the nineteenth century the power-allocating provisions of the national constitution (federalism and separation
of powers) were thought to be important structures for maximizing individual liberty.88
If section 1983 does not embrace commerce clause claims, another
round of analysis will be called for: for what rights secured by the Constitution does section 1983 make available a remedy? The Court then
also must consider the full implications of its decision in McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco8 9 on the duty of the states to
provide adequate remedies for state violations of federal constitutional
commands. 9 0
2. Scope of Section 1983. - In Golden State, the Court does not suggest that the NLRA itself satisfied the four criteria established by Cort v.
Ash 9 for judicial recognition of implied rights of action. If it had,
"arising under" jurisdktion (and the award of an injunction and compensatory damages) could have been predicated on that basis alone,
86. 234 Neb. 427, 451 N.W.2d 676, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
87. Interestingly, however, an analogous distinction has surfaced in academic writing on the measure of damages in § 1983 actions for constitutional violations. See
Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 997, 1000, 1011-17 (1990) (criticizing efforts to exclude damages when the constitutional violation causes only "systemic" injury).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964, 1970-71 (1990) (separation of power); Federalist No. 84 (A. Hamilton); see also Monaghan, Book Review, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 296, 308-11 (1980) (discussing relationship between constitutional structure and individual liberty). Moreover, Justice Kennedy's argument seems to be, at bottom, in tension with Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2518-19 (1990),
which held that health care providers could challenge state reimbursement rates for
Medicaid under § 1983. It is difficult to see a suit challenging a state rate structure
resonating in conventional "personal right" terms.
89. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
90. See id. at 2247, 2258; Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425,
1519 (1987) (stressing duty of states to provide remedies for violation of federal
commands).
91. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The four factors have been reduced to the question of
legislative intent, and the Court has shown ever hardening resistance to the implication
of such rights. See, e.g., Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263,
109 S. Ct. 1282, 1286-87 (1989).
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without need for any reference to section 1983.92 In Wilder v. Virginia

Hospital Association,9 3 both the Court and the dissent render explicit
what Golden State assumed: section 1983's availability turns only on
whether federal statutory law creates a "primary" right, even though
the federal law does not otherwise establish a "remedial" right (i.e., a
right of action). In a footnote in Wilder, the Court noted that the availability of section 1983 presents "a different inquiry" from that involved
in implied right of action analysis. 9 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, agreed on this point. He observed that the Court's section 1983
jurisprudence in effect reduced Cort v. Ash's four factors to its first: did
the "statute[] contain a right 'in favor of' the particular plaintiff." 95
This observation serves to highlight Golden State's importance because
96
judicial resistance is hardening against implication of rights of action.
Golden State thus "completes the process of divorcing section 1983
from its historical [and rights] roots and directs the focus of future
cases away from the availability of a section 1983 cause of action and
toward the scope of the right asserted under a particular constitutional
or statutory provision." 9 7 Section 1983 is, of course, unavailable if
Congress has "specifically" foreclosed the remedy. 98 But both Golden
State and Wilder shore up the intimations in prior case law that this limitation is exceedingly narrow. 9 9 Implied preemption of a section 1983
remedy on the basis of the assertedly comprehensive nature of the remedial scheme created by the federal legislation is not favored; indeed,
92. Unless itself foreclosed by the statute creating the right, § 1983 would simply
provide a parallel basis for relief. But the availability of § 1983 is important because
counsel fees are available to successful § 1983 litigants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
Moreover, § 1983 authorizes punitive damages. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34-38
(1983).
93. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
94. Id. at 2517 n.9.
95. Id. at 2526. This is not quite accurate because ChiefJustice Rehnquist reformulates the first Cort factor by omitting "especial." Cort asks, "is the plaintiff 'one of the
class for whom especial benefit the statute was enacted.'" 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas
& Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)); accord supra note 91 and accompanying text.
96. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 948-49; supra note 91. Of course, the
remaining three Cort factors retain importance with respect to suits against persons not

subject to § 1983.
97. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, Leading Cases, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 340
(1990). The commentator suggests that by depriving § 1983 of its "special" quality, all
§ 1983 actions may become more vulnerable to judge made door-closing doctrines such
as abstention. See id. at 347-48.
98. See supra text accompanying note 71.
99. Compare Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
423-29 (1987) (holding that complex enforcement scheme of Brooke Amendment to
Housing Act did not foreclose a parallel § 1983 remedy) with Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1981) (intent to foreclose
§ 1983 found in comprehensive remedial scheme provided by Congress, which itself
provided for private actions).
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Wilder pointedly observed that "only on two occasions" had the Court
held that the section 1983 remedy was foreclosed on these grounds.10 0
Golden State closes any Hohfeldian gap between primary federal
statutory rights and section 1983 rights of action. The latter follows
simply from the existence of the former. Apart from article III's requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability,' 0o the only
limiting principle on the apparent sweep of section 1983 in enforcing
federal legal obligations is the Court's statement in Golden State that section 1983 "may not be available" when the plaintiffs are benefited
"only as an incident of the federal scheme of regulation."'10 2 "May
not" is more than that; as Wilder demonstrates, whether a plaintiff is
categorized as an intended or an incidental beneficiary determines
whether or not that plaintiff has a primary federal right. l0 3
We must therefore determine whether the Boren Amendment
creates a "federal right" that is enforceable under § 1983.
Such an inquiry turns on whether "the provision in question
was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff." . . . If so, the
provision creates an enforceable right unless it reflects merely
a "congressional preference" for a certain kind of conduct
rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit, ....
or unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is "too vague and
amorphous" such that it is "'beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce.' "104
The term "right" contained in section 1983, therefore, expresses the
crucial conclusions with respect to whom are owed the legal duties created by federal statutes.
II.

OF PRIMARY AND REMEDIAL LAW

Golden State's search for an underlying "federal right" draws not
only on section 1983's explicit language but on currents deeply embedded in our legal and political culture. Apostolic authority instructs us
100. See Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2523 (referring to National Sea Clammers Ass'n, and
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)).
101. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 110 S. Ct. 1249, 1253-54 (1990);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
102. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444,450 (1990).
103. To the extent that the distinction between intended and incidental beneficiaries depends upon a determination of congressional intent, it may impose quite a
significant limit on the availability of § 1983 after Golden' State. See, for example, the
reasoning of the Wilder dissent, infra note 104.
104. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2517 (citations omitted). In Wilder, the Court divided 5-4
on whether the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act created legal rights in health
care providers. Apparently acknowledging that the amendment created legal obligations, the dissent denied that it conferred "any substantive rights on Medicaid services
providers." Id. at 2527 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). They were simply incidental beneficiaries of any legal obligations established by the amendment, which were matters between the state and national government alone. The dissent also argued that if any
private rights were created, they were of a procedural, not substantive, nature. See id.
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that "the province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."' 10 5 More important here, the judicial fixation on a search for
and articulation of the relevant "federal right" is an analytic approach
that not only has powerful cultural appeal but also is quite useful for
the concrete needs at hand. 10 6 Nonetheless, uncertain use of familiar
legal terms can cause unnecessary confusion. For example, "cause of
action" is a term thought to possess such intractable difficulties that it
was banished from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 7 Of course,
the effort failed; the term persists in the working vocabulary of lawyers
and judges with the tenacity of original sin.10 8 More to the point here,
the term "right" is susceptible to particular uncertainty because it is
"incorrigibly multifarious in actual usage."' 1 9 For example, to state
that A has no right against B may carry either of two different meanings: A lacks a primary right against B, or A has such a primary right
but no remedial right. Thus, an important distinction exists between
primary and remedial law.
A. Primary Law
Primary law concerns the "authoritative directive arrangements"or more simply, the legal rules-that govern persons independently of
litigation."10 In this domain, concepts such as "rights," "duties," "immunities," and "powers" simply describe the various "characteristic
positions" held by persons in relationship to one another."' "Duty"
plays a pivotal role: active in character, this term describes the position
of a person who is legally required to act, not to act, or to act only in a
certain way. 1 2 Surprisingly, perhaps, at first blush "primary right"
seems to be a theoretically uninteresting concept: wholly passive, it
simply mirrors the primary duty. "[A] 'right,' if spoken of with
Hohfeldian accuracy, is a position which a person has because someone
else has a duty in the performance of which the right-holder is ...inter105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
106. For example, in Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990), the Court described
§ 1983 as a federal remedy, a federal right, a federal right of action, and a federal cause
of action-but the differing taxonomy did not at all impede the Court's measured consideration of the fundamental institutional issue before it.
107. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
108. For examples of the persistence of the confusion caused by the term, see Note,
Claim Preclusion in Modem Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second
Suits, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1989, 1991-95 (1990).
109. Hart & Sacks, 1 The Legal Process: Basic Problems In the Making and Application of Law 151 (tent. ed. 1958). At the remedial level, the concept of duty also plays
area it simply restates the primary right. Of
a role. Ordinarily, however, in the civil
course, that need not be the case, as the numerous decisions awarding treble and punitive damage show. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34-38 (1983) (punitive damages may be awarded in a "proper case" in a § 1983 action).
110. Hart & Sacks, supra note 109, at 142.
111. Id. at 141-42.
112. Id. at 145.
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ested."" 3 This perception contains much that illuminates. 1 14 Golden
State itself makes apparent the passive, reflective character of a primary
right. For all its emphasis on the need to establish the existence of a
"right," the Court's description of what that meant was repeatedly cast
in terms descriptive of the kind of obligations imposed on the putative
duty holder:
In deciding whether a federal right has been violated, we have
considered whether the provision in question creates obligations binding on the governmental unit or rather "does no
more than express a congressional preference for certain
kinds of treatment." The interest the plaintiff asserts must not
be "too vague and amorphous" to be "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." We have also asked
whether the provision in question was "inten[ded] to benefit"
the putative plaintiff. 15
The Court's reasoning correctly assumes the need to establish both (a)
the existence of a legal obligation, and (b), the "persons" to whom the
obligation is owed: the "what" and the "to whom." The latter can be
one person, several, or the entire population. From this perspective,
the judicial concern with primary right draws attention to the "to
whom" issue-the persons who in a legally cognizable sense are "interested" in the duty holder's discharge of his obligations. The effort (exemplified in both Golden State and Wilder) is to capture a distinction
between those who are "incidental" beneficiaries of federal programs
imposing duties and those who are intentionally protected. To be sure,
this inquiry can be, and has been, extracted from the concept of dutyA owes a duty to B but not to C-but the Court's inquiry into the federal "right" is a way of highlighting the important fact that duties imposed by federal law are not necessarily owed to the public at large.
The word federal is properly underscored, at least initially. One
could argue that the American political tradition supports, even though
it may not require, a theory of judicial recognition of federal primary
rights more restrictive than that applied at the state law level. 1 6 This
position might be defended as a residual aspect of our constitutional
tradition of a national government of (theoretically) limited powers, or,
perhaps more persuasively, as expressive of an appropriate federal ju113. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
114. Hart and Sacks argue that there is comparatively little need for the concept of
primary right in private law, see id. at 153, but that "the concept of private right has an
important and highly distinctive role in the analysis of relations between private persons
and [public] officials." Id. at 153 n.7. That demonstration is never made, however.
115. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 448 (1989)
(citations omitted).
116. The actual content of this restrictive theory remains unclear. But see
Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 523 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating
"a flat rule that private rights of action will not be implied in statutes hereafter
enacted").
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dicial role grounded in separation of powers concerns. Any such contention is, however, misplaced. Claims of excessive judicial lawmaking
made in the context of criticizing the propriety of implying rights of
action 117 seem unpersuasive: perhaps judicial establishment of new
primary duties invades the legislative prerogative, but fashioning remedial rights hardly seems to rise to that level. In any event, whatever the
merits of implying a right of action, this dispute has no relevance to
deciding whether the legislature has created a primary right.
When both the duty and a general right of action (section 1983)
have been established by Congress, no persuasive claim of excessive
lawmaking exists because the Court discharges an ancient task in determining whether A is an intended, rather than an incidental, beneficiary."18 In the area of primary rights, there seems to be no reason to
impose unusual restrictions on the courts that interpret the will of
Congress.
B. Remedial Law
Section 1983 is, of course, an express right of action, and Golden
State and Wilder close the gap between primary right and remedial right,
making the existence of the former determinative of the existence of
the latter. 19 This development is important because the existence of a
primary right entails no necessary conclusion that the right holder can
of a remedial
sue. 120 To sue, a plaintiff must establish the existence
21
right, a right of action in the traditional language:'
A right of action is a species of power-of remedial power. It
is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative application upon a disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim
122
proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy.
117. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
118. In the Golden State situation, the existence vel non of the primary right determines whether a remedial right exists. See infra text accompanying note 119 But the
remedial right, § 1983, was created by Congress, so the excessive lawmaking argument
is inapplicable.
119. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
120. Indeed, the violation of the duty may have no consequences even in
an enforcement proceeding against the right holder. See, e.g., United States v.
Montalvo-Murillo, 110 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1990).
121. The right of action might be expressly conferred, or it might be implied if the
four criteria set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), are met. See supra notes 91-96
and accompanying text.
122. Hart & Sacks, supra note 109, at 154. Earlier, Hart and Sacks described a
power as a situation in which the law offers a person "positive assistance" by imposing
duties on others to respect the power-holder's decisions. "A power may be defined as a
capacity, either singly or in concert with one or more others, to effect by a deliberative
act a settlement of a question of group living which will be accepted and enforced by the
official representatives of the group." Id. at 148-49.
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But the beneficiary of a primary right may not possess a right of action:
alternathere may be no express action and one may not be implied;123
tively, any right of action may inhere only in a public official.
Distinguishing among rights, rights of action, and remedies helps
illuminate some issues, particularly issues arising in the context of
"Our Federalism." For example, in a diversity case how shall we understand the respective relationship between state and federal law?
Clearly, both the underlying duty and the right of action are drawn
from state law. But what of the remedy? It is possible, but rather awkward, to conceive of the federal court as awarding a "state law remedy."
For me, the federal court simply supplies a federal remedy to enforce a
state-created right of action. This formulation better captures our understanding that state law cannot authorize the award of remedies beyond those authorized by Congress, 12 4 but Congress may enlarge
remedies beyond what state law authorizes.' 25 Similarly, section 1983
in federal and state
simply provides a minimum remedy, available 126
courts, to enforce many federally-created rights.
123. It is possible to argue that a primary right has little value if the right holder has
no right of action and hence no power to enforce the right. In reality, however, the
existence of the primary right generally presupposes some remedy against the duty
holder for breach of duty, even though the right holder may not have a remedial
"sword" himself. For example, before Bivens, fourth amendment rights were enforceable, not only as a "shield"-a defense to a criminal prosecution-but also under state
law.
I should add here that judicial references to the existence of the "cause of action"
created by section 1983 are operationally equivalent to the assertion that section 1983 is
available because the plaintiff has claimed both the existence of a legal duty and a primary right in the plaintiff's favor. To that extent at least, the term's persistence is ordinarily quite harmless. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2516
(1990).
124. See Pusey &Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497-99 (1923). As Pusey &
Jones itself illustrates, this will often entail a difficult determination of whether the state
law created a new substantive right or simply an additional remedy. Compare Pusey &
Jones, 261 U.S. at 498 (state statute conferred remedy so enforcement in federal court
denied) with Guardian Sav. & Trust Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 7, 267 U.S. 1,
6-7 (1925) (state law created new right).
125. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 339 U.S. 667, 674 (1950) (fact that
"the declaratory remedy which may be given in the federal courts may not be available
in the state courts is immaterial"). In my view, Congress could constitutionally reinstate
the equitable remedial rights doctrine established by Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101
(1915). The logic of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819), which
was cited in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965), seems to me to be controlling.
The power of Congress to establish courts subsumes the power to enact rules that are
rationally classifiable as procedural or remedial. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat) 1 (1825), which, unless abandoned, completely settles the point; accord Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 700-06 (1974). Thus, to the extent
that Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960), indicates that Congress
lacks the power in a diversity case to give 'juster justice," it is wrong.
126. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969), the Court
casually characterized the state court as awarding "a federal remedy" when enforcing
the implied right of action created by 42 U.S.C. § 1982. This description is unsound. In
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27
III. SECTION 1983 AND THE APA1

Golden State should be compared with developments that have now
taken hold in the area of standing under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to obtain judicial review of the compliance
of federal officials with federal statutory commands.' 28 There is, however, a natural resistance to undertaking such a comparison. Our reflex
is to think of section 1983 as involving trial oriented litigation in which
plaintiffs seek damages caused by "constitutional torts" like assault,
battery, and defamation, with issues of sovereign and official immunity
sharply arising. On the other hand, APA review appears to involve the
quite different task of judicial review of the compliance of federal officials with federal norms. In fact, however, as both Golden State and Wilder illustrate, much section 1983 litigation after Maine v. Thiboutot 129 is
at bottom no more than judicial review of the compliance of state
(rather than federal) officials with federal statutory norms. And in both
cases the Court distinguishes between "intended" beneficiaries, who
may sue, and "incidental" beneficiaries, who may not.
A. A Comparison Between Section 1983 and APA Section 702
To the extent that section 1983 functions like section 702, a methodological comparison is warranted. The most important barrier to
that undertaking is the differences in the operative vocabulary. Section
702 replaces familiar section 1983 (Hohfeldian) terminology such as
right, duty, and right of action with a provision stating that any "person
suffering legal wrong.., or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
enforcing federal rights the state courts are not simply transformed into federal courts.
Like state court jurisdiction and state court rules of procedure, the remedy awarded has
its ground in state law: "federal law sets certain minimum [remedial] requirements that
States must meet but may exceed in providing appropriate relief." American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2331 (1990). Although state courts may be
obliged to entertain jurisdiction and to provide a remedy materially parallel to the federal remedy, see Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2439 (1990), federal preemption of
state jurisdictional, procedural, and remedial rules to the extent that they obstruct enforcement of federal law does not pro tanto transform the character of the state courts.
See id. at 2440 n.17. Precisely this same understanding underlies the Court's decision in
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S.Ct. 2238 (1990),
which did not involve § 1983, but did stress the independent duty of state courts to
provide remedies adequate to enforce federal constitutional commands: "The State is
free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the
minimum federal requirements we have outlined." Id. at 2258.
127. Part III of this Article benefitted from conversations with my colleagues
Richard Pierce and especially Peter Strauss.
128. The term "standing" itself seems to have become common in legal usage only
in this century. See J. Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law 55
(1978). APA "standing" litigation developed historically before Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), made section 1983 important. But, like § 1983, most standing concerns involve the attempted use of federal substantive law as a sword.
129. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof."' 3 0 But the language differences mask important structural similarities between section 1983 and section 702. In Hohfeldian
terms, like section 1983, section 702 provides a general "right of action." Like section 1983, it, too, is available even though there is no
other express or implied right of action.13 1 Also like section 1983, it
embodies the important distinction between primary and remedial law.
And, as Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation132 shows, section 702, like
section 1983, ultimately requires distinguishing between intended and
incidental beneficiaries.
Lujan originated as a challenge by an environmental group to federal agency decisions permitting increased mining on public lands. After noting that no claim of an implied right of action had been made,
the Court said that plaintiff's standing depended upon a demonstration
that it was "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. . . .":133
the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of (his
aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the
"zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statutory
provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388,
396-397 . .. Thus, for example, the failure of an agency to
comply with a statutory provision requiring "on the record"
hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the
company that has the contract to record and transcribe the
agency's proceedings; but since the provision was obviously
enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that company would 13
not
4
be "adversely affected within the meaning" of the statute.
This inquiry is substantially parallel to that required by Golden State:
the section 1983 plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty of which
she is an intended beneficiary.135 Clarke, cited by the Court in Lujan,
had noted that the APA standing test is more liberal than the standard
for implying a private right of action in cases in which the APA is inapplicable; the latter requires the plaintiff to show membership in a "class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." 13 6 Although "especial" is not a requirement under section 702 of the APA (or of section
130. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Here I refer to the line of standing decisions generated
by Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
131. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400-01 n.16 (1987).
132. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
133. Id. at 3186.
134. Id.
135. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 405-06
(D.C. Cir. 1990), is unusual in that it ignores this dimension in discussing review under
the APA.
136. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400-01 n.16 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
The Court stated that more was required of the "would-be plaintiffs in Cort than a show-
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1983),137 section 702 only confers standing to intended and not incidental beneficiaries. Lujan also imposed a causation requirement for
APA standing comparable to the same inquiry in section 1983 actions.
The Court found that although the litigants asserted the sorts of aesthetic and recreational use interests that the relevant federal statutes
were designed to protect, and thus the plaintiffs were "intended beneficiaries," the record failed to show that those interests were affected by
the specific agency action challenged. 38 Proof that the defendant's
conduct caused injury to the plaintiff is, of course, also a long-recognized standing requirement in section 1983 actions. 1 39
The convergence of the two lines of decisions appears from another aspect of Lujan. The APA's "finality" requirement and settled
rules governing ripeness bar premature challenges to governmental
conduct. 140 More specifically, as the Court said in Lujan, ordinarily
plaintiffs cannot bring wholesale challenges to agency misconduct or
mismanagement; in most cases those who seek "wholesale improvement
of [a governmental] program" must resort to "the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are
normally made."' 14 1 Here, too, APA review parallels developments in
section 1983 litigation. The Court has some-but by no means complete-reluctance to permit plaintiffs to invoke section 1983 to bring
systemic challenges to state governmental agencies on the ground that
ing that their interests were arguably within the zone protected or regulated by" the
statute in a claim under the APA. Id.
137. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
138. See 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89. The affidavits showed only that two of plaintiff's
members used "unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions
of which mining activity has occurred." Id. at 3179.
139. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-08 (1975). It is also a requirement in standing cases not implicating section 1983. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984), and its progeny.
140. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review."); see also Currie, Federal Courts Cases and Materials 57-69 (4th ed.
1990) (dealing with finality, ripeness, and exhaustion); Ukiah Valley Medical Center v.
FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 264 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between ripeness, a judgemade prudential doctrine, and finality, ajurisdictional requirement). The ripeness and
standing requirements are not entirely independent. See Currie, supra, at 44.
141. 110 S. Ct. at 3190. The Court added:
Absent [statutory authority], however, a regulation is not ordinarily considered
the type of agency action "ripe" for judicial review under the APA until the
scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions,
and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the
regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to
harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a
practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such
agency action is "ripe" for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory
review apart from the APA is provided .... )
Id. The Court's initial reference to "regulation" seems out of place because the whole
point of the suit was that there was no regulation, but the general point is clear.
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the agency is being mismanaged contrary to federal law. 14 2
Other symmetries exist. For example, the Court's requirement
that a plaintiff's section 1983 claim assert more than a congressional
preference and not be too open-ended for judicial enforcement resonates with APA cases refusing judicial review when "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."' 143 Furthermore, the case law
shows a presumption of reviewability under the APA, but Congress can
agency action just as it may forespecifically foreclose review of federal
44
close a section 1983 remedy.'
Of course, some differences remain, at least so far:' 45 section 702
does not itself authorize suits for damages without the consent of Congress, or for punitive damages.' 46 This distinction is not crucial when
the real relief sought is declaratory or injunctive, and, in addition, the
case turns on the meaning of the underlying federal statutes.' 4 7 But
the distinction can matter. To be sure, doctrines of sovereign and official immunity make damages of any kind hard to obtain from public
officials under section 1983 when the gist of the complaint is no more
than that state officials have transgressed federal statutory com142. Compare O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500-01 (1974) (refusing to grant
injunctive relief under § 1983) with Missouri v.Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) (decrees
entered to bring about school desegregation). See generally Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976) (arguing that the traditional role of adjudication-resolving disputes among private parties-has increasingly
given way to the determination of issues of public law); Note, The Dual Role of the
Structural Injunction, 99 Yale LJ. 1983 (1990) (discussing the use of the "structural
injunction" in such areas as school desegregation, reform of state mental health systems,
and reform of state penal institutions).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988). See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2053
(1988); United States Information Agency v. KRC, 905 F.2d 389, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 689,
693-733 (1990).
144. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987); Block v.
Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
145. The scope of the differences, at least as to who may sue, depends upon the
extent to which the "zone of interest" requirement is equivalent to the "primary federal
right" requirement. The "zone of interest" requirement has been applied to standing
cases outside the APA context. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); see also City of
Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1990) ("If a petitioner can establish that it has suffered an injury within that zone of
interests, it will necessarily have satisfied the constitutional injury requirement as
well."). Thus, if the "zone of interest" and "federal primary right" inquiries are interchangeable, it appears that the issues of standing, "arising under"jurisdiction, remedial
right, and "federal primary right" are all on their way to becoming one and the same
inquiry. See Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 234-39 (1988)
(standing not a separate inquiry but rather a determination on merits of plaintiff's
claim).
146. Section 702 waives sovereign immunity except for money damages.
147. Not only does § 702 not authorize review, the monetary claim cannot be pursued under the Federal Torts Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
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mands.' 48 But public bodies below the state and its subdivisions hold
no immunity from damage claims, and they may be held liable for the
49
consequences of their seemingly official policies.1
Other differences also exist, most significantly with respect to the
scope of review. The Chevron doctrine, which requires judicial deference to reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous statutes, 50 is
not directly applicable to section 1983 actions. But in section 1983 actions based on violations of federal statutory law, I believe that courts
should review actions by state officials who adhere to the construction
given to federal statutes by the responsible federal administrative officials with the same deference under Chevron that would be applied in
section 702 proceedings to review the federal official conduct. Nor is
there any reason to believe that section 1983 actions against state officials for the violation of federal statutes would require a disregard of
any administration record or of the APA's substantial evidence test, if
5
otherwise appropriate.' '
B. Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
Whatever the differences between section 1983 and section 702,
Golden State and Wilder bring section 1983 criteria closer to APA standing rules when the issue is who may sue. Under both statutes not everyone can sue; something more than "injury in fact" must be established,
however that term is defined. The availability of section 1983 turns on
the distinction between direct and incidental beneficiaries.' 5 2 While at
first blush the APA's "adversely affected" language may suggest a more
148. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), requires the plaintiff to show
that the defendant's conduct violated "clearly established statutory rights." For recent
discussion, see Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine In the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 23

(1989).
149. For lucid discussions of the line of cases beginning with Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), see Oren, Immunity and Accountability In Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should
Pay?, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 935, 962-69 (1989); Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section
1983: Some Lessons From Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 Geo. LJ. 1753

(1989).
150. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865-66 (1984).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
152. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. In Golden State the Court
observed that when Congress has "just 'occupied the field' with legislation that is passed
solely with the interest of the general public in mind... [and] benefits particular parties
only as an incident of the federal scheme of regulation, a private damages remedy under
§ 1983 may not be available." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S.
Ct. 444, 450 (1989). The "may not" should be a "cannot." The distinction between
direct and incidental beneficiaries appears in other contexts such as antitrust, see, e.g.,
Kansas & Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990), and the third party
beneficiary doctrine in contract law, see generally E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 10.3 (2d
ed. 1990) (collecting cases and statutes).
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pragmatic and generous attitude toward permitting access by plaintiffs
than that suggested by section 1983's "a federal right" language, that
difference is, at best, likely to be marginal. 15 3 The section 702 litigant
must still show that she is adversely affected "within the meaning of a
relevant statute," a requirement that, after Lujan, seems identical to the
Court's insistence in Golden State that the section 1983 plaintiff must
establish that she is more than simply an "incidental" beneficiary of a
federal statute.15 4 That symmetrical approaches are taken in the two
contexts is entirely justified because (so far as is relevant here) both are
concerned with the same issue: determining who is a proper plaintiff
when public officials (federal or state) have transgressed norms imposed by federal law.
The distinction between intended beneficiaries and bystanders has
the appearance of a conventional legal question: what did Congress
intend? No doubt there is much truth to such a characterization of the
problem, but there is more to the matter than that. Judicial attitudes,
often formed by deep but imperfectly conscious intuitions, will play a
role, at least at the margins, in making this distinction. We can, accordingly, expect to see similar divisions in both section 1983 and APA section 702 cases over just who, legally, is only a "bystander."' 15 5 My own
bias is toward ready access to the courts. I have never been persuaded
that deep separation of powers concerns exist every time courts entertain suits by those hurt by administrative agencies to determine
whether the injury-causing agency conduct was wrongful.
My bias aside, precedents developed under section 702 and section
1983 will, I suspect, prove to be interchangeable. Thus, persons who
are subject to state regulation (as in Golden State and Wilder) contrary to
federal law will readily be found to be right holders. 156 It seems unlikely, though, that the ultimate "beneficiaries" of federal regulatory
153. Indeed, in Golden State the Court used expansive language in referring to statutes "intended to benefit the putative plaintiff." 110 S. Ct. at 449.
154. See also Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1984)
(discussed in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)) (milk handlers
can obtain judicial review of pricing orders by Secretary of Agriculture, but milk consumers have no such right of action).
155. These disputes will, at the least, bear a family resemblance to the kinds of
disputes that have previously surfaced over what constitutes injury in fact. What should
count as 'injury' often involves important normative conclusions. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1365-71 (1973) (tracing evolution of concept of injury). See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at
123-28 (reviewing key standing cases involving questions of adequacy and diffuseness
of injury). Lujan itself is illustrative, in its assumption that injury to aesthetic and recreational use interests can constitute injury in fact. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187-89 (1990); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
110 S.Ct. 1884, 1889 (1990) (competitive injury not enough to constitute antitrust injury; injury must stem from illegal anticompetitive activity).
156. These plaintiffs can sue under the APA. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399; National
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 402 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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and entitlement programs will be able to invoke section 1983 to compel
state officials to comply with the federal obligations imposed on them;
they are likely to be treated as "incidental beneficiaries." In Wilder, for
example, it is doubtful that the patients dealing with the health care
providers would be treated as appropriate plaintiffs to assert that the
state rates transgressed federal law. This seems to be the teaching of
the APA cases, which frequently deny standing to the ultimate benefitypically on the grounds of "causation" and
ciaries of federal statutes,
"non-redressability."' 15 7 Only beneficiaries asserting something that
looks like a "property" right will be able to seek review. 158 Thus, in
Golden State Justice Kennedy had no doubt that persons asserting a
"property" claim-for example, to social security benefits or a particular rent calculation-could properly invoke section 1983.159 Curiously,
however, he dissented in Wilder, even though the plaintiffs were asserting what could be seen as a federal property entitlement comparable to
a particular rent calculation. Perhaps this was based on an unexpressed
intuition that judicial review could not work in the health care area with
any effectiveness,16 0 or on a view that corporate public contracts were
troublesome in this regard. 16 1
A commentator recently has insisted that the Court's refusal to
confer standing upon beneficiaries of programs reflects a return to an
older private rights or Hohfeldian model of administrative law in which
157. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) ("Recognition of standing in
such circumstances would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle for
the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.' ") (quoting United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 37-42 (1976). See generally Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432, 1480 (1988) (collecting cases and accusing Court
of "hostility to suits brought by beneficiaries of regulatory programs to ensure fidelity to
statute").
158. The Supreme Court may address the issue soon given the split in the circuits
over whether the Model Cities Act creates rights in employees enforceable through
§ 1983. Compare Former Special Project Employees Ass'n v. City of Norfolk, 909 F.2d
89, 94 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that Model Cities Act does not create such rights) with
Members of the Bridgeport Hous. Auth. Police Force v. City of Bridgeport, 646 F.2d 55,
62 (2d Cir.) (Model Cities Act does create such rights), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
159. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
160. Whether the Court's Wilder decision will actually prove important is an interesting question. There is serious doubt that courts have the institutional capacity to
determine what rates are "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs incurred,"
although the Court believed that it could make such determinations. 110 S. Ct. at
2522-23. But in comparable fields the Court has effectively withdrawn from serious
scrutiny. See Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should The Judiciary Attempt
to Police The Political Institutions?, 77 Geo. L.J. 2031, 2053-70 (1989). For a recent
illustration in the utility rate-setting context, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S.
Ct. 609, 618-19 (1989).
161. See San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San
Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1987), criticized in Note, San Bernardino Physicians'
Services Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino: Constitutionally Protected Public
Contract Property Interests Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 879 (1990).
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the only proper litigant is a person asserting interests protected by the
common law. 162 - But this characterization seems overdrawn. Judicial
review is now available to whole categories of litigants who would have
been barred by at least the early version of the private rights model.
Moreover, APA section 702 and section 1983 review are open to plaintiffs asserting not only the traditional common law property interests
but also, as Justice Kennedy acknowledges, the "New Property" interests created by the welfare state. 163 In addition, Lujan is inconsistent
with this characterization; there the Court seemed quite willing to assume that aesthetic and recreational use interests were protected by the
relevant federal statutes. 164
CONCLUSION

When the issue is whether a public official violated a federal statutory norm, the structure of the inquiry under section 1983 and section
702 of the APA is largely identical. Both analyses reflect the distinction
between primary and remedial law that runs back to well before
Hohfeld. In both cases, the Court must focus on inquiries of primary
law: what were the duties, and who are the intended beneficiaries of
the federal statutes from which the rights are derived. If these determinations are decided favorably to the plaintiff, section 1983 and APA
section 702 review follow generally as a matter of course, as Golden
State, Wilder, and Lujan demonstrate. And that, I submit, is how things
should be.
ADDENDUM

Just as this Article went to print, the Supreme Court decided Dennis
v. Higgins. Relying in part on Golden State, a 7-2 majority held that section 1983 was available to vindicate negative commerce clause
claims. 165 Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented,
again insisting on a dichotomy between "rights-securing and powerallocating" provisions. 16 6 He argued that the Court's decision "com67
pounds the error of Golden State.'
162. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1434-35. This model accords standing to
litigants urging that the government is interfering with liberty or property interests that
the common law of property and tort would secure against private interference. For
example, because the common law conferred no immunity from competition, competitors were denied standing. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-80
(1938).
163. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733 (1964).
164. 110 S. Ct. at 3187.
165. 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1142, *4, 1991 WL 18099, *2 (Feb. 20, 1991).
166. 1991 U.S. LEXIS at *29, 1991 WL at *10.
167. 1991 U.S. LEXIS at *21, 1991 WL at *7.

